Indo-Naga political issue —The complexities of the elusive final agreement

Vivan Eyben | Source: Newsclick

An important concern for the Naga people – at least on the Indian side of the border – is the issue over the final agreement. The Framework Agreement has been in effect since 2015. The Indian government has maintained that the agreement is ‘historic’. However, the fact remains that these ‘agreements’ and ‘accords’ have been signed in the past as well.

Till date, the only successful accord has been the Mizo Accord. Since the end of the Mizo uprising, there has been no widespread rebellion involving a large number of Mizo people. In this context, ‘historic’ is only a hyperbole.

On Saturday, April 7, the Union Minister of State for Home, Kiren Rijiju made a statement that the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak Muivah) (NSCN [IM]) has dropped the demand of sovereignty and that the territorial integrity of the states housing significant Naga populations will not be compromised.

Two days later, the NSCN (IM) hit back, stating that the minister is not competent to comment on the issue. The release from the NSCN (IM) also stated that the group dropping the demand of sovereignty was merely a ‘figment of his (Rijiju’s) imagination’.

However, the issue at hand is that the minister, in one brilliant move, has rejected the foremost demand of every Naga National Political Group (NNPG), as well as the only bargaining tool the centre could have used in any negotiation. The issue of sovereignty is still a powerful issue for the Naga people. The issue finds its origins in the formation of the Naga Club that submitted their demands of sovereignty to the Simon Commission in 1929.

This group became the Naga National Council (NNC) later. In the 1940s, Angami Zapu Phizo of the NNC energised the idea of Naga sovereignty, which led to what is now one of the oldest wars in the world. The Shillong Accord, which broke the NNC quickly, saw the establishment of the state of Nagaland.

However, those, who opposed the Accord, formed the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) – led by Isak Chishi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah, and Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang. Though the NSCN went through several splits—the most famous in 1988 with the creation of the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions—the demand for sovereignty never quite waned.

The centre has the option of bringing all the stakeholders on board – including the Khaplang faction, and then presenting an offer short of sovereignty. The most attractive offer would be an autonomous Nagaland or Nagalim state comprising of all the areas inhabited by Nagas. This, of course, would be a political suicide in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur. Any mention of this in the run up to the 2019 elections would sink the already leaky ship of the government. On the other hand, for the NNPGs, any mention that they are willing to accept a solution that neither includes sovereignty nor integration would be a political suicide.

It is pertinent to mention that though the negotiations are being conducted with the NSCN (IM) as the main negotiating party, six other NNPGs are also involved. There are other groups as well that have declined any offer to join the talks. One of them is the National Socialist Council for Nagaland (Khaplang) [NSCN (K)], who abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Indian government in 2015.

The other group is the NNC faction led by Phizo Adino. Adino’s stand gives an impression that they are still waiting to negotiate a treaty with the centre. The demand for a treaty rather than an agreement or accord signals that the group still considers Nagas as a sovereign entity because in international law, treaties are signed between ‘States’. In the present scenario, the NNC is a non-entity, and it is unlikely that their absence will have much effect on the negotiation. The NSCN (K), on the other hand, is fully capable of playing a spoilsport.

The NSCN (K) had been in a ceasefire with the centre till 2015. However, the reasons for NSCN (K) abrogating the ceasefire have not often been discussed. Prior to the abrogation, the NSCN (K) had complained bitterly of the Assam Rifles (AR) and other Security Forces (SF) violating the ceasefire by targeting their members. The AR had, at one point, cordoned off a camp of the Khaplang faction.

This had prompted the group to abandon the camp without informing the Indian government – a violation of the ceasefire. This had led to the formation of what is now the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW). On the NSCN(K)’s raising day , the speakers referred to Western South East Asia (WESEA) – a clear indication that the group has rejected the term ‘Northeast’ and perhaps indicative of their commitment to the idea of a united WESEA.